Tuned: The Co-Founder That Built Too Fast
The harness made building so cheap I built most of the product before checking anyone would pay. A good co-founder's risky side, a solo founder's trap.
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Buy the board first, or write the code first? A new hardware product usually starts with one or the other. I did neither. The first thing I did was set up the harness. No parts, no code.
Setting it up first is something I would do again. Looking back, the problem was in what I did with it next.
The harness was already on the shelf
One thing I should say first. I didn’t build a new harness for Tuned. I took out harness-maker, a tool I had built for earlier projects and already open-sourced, and used it as it was. It shapes itself to each project, so Tuned’s harness came out of a single command. That is why “harness first” cost me so little.
What it does for a solo founder is clear. Claude and Codex get set up for the project in one pass. You get a loop that runs plan, execute, review, wrapup. Worktrees keep the firmware, the app, and the tooling from getting in each other’s way as they run in parallel. And the adversarial review gates stand in for the second pair of eyes I don’t have when I work alone.
The last one mattered most. Once, an automatic check passed a data contract that had been copied by hand across four files, because it ignored the field order. Give the model the same fields in a different order and the device quietly produces garbage. If I had compared those four files by eye, I would have missed it. An adversarial test that parsed the contract and fixed the order in place caught it. For a solo founder, a gate like that is the second reviewer.
What the harness actually did
Seen this far, the harness looks like a coding tool. But the first thing it did had nothing to do with code.
I fanned out market research with a dynamic workflow. The agents went down many paths and came back with a graveyard of dead tennis sensors. I went through them one by one, and the reason was the same each time. None of them died from weak hardware. They died on demand and retention. People used them once or twice and put them in a drawer. The question that really mattered was where a frustrated player’s money actually goes.
On that basis I settled the tech direction and wrote the spec. Then I made a lot of app mockups. I give the direction I want as a seed, and the dynamic workflow searches the web, papers, arXiv, and Reddit and quickly puts screens together as HTML. More than a hundred came out. My job was to notice the few that made me think, “I never would’ve come up with this on my own.”
One refined app mockup out of the hundred-plus the harness poured out. A phrase like “Impact, in one line” wasn’t something I dreamed up from the start either; it was a wow point I fished out of that pile. Every number on the screen is fake mockup data.
The way we split the work is simple. The harness generates; I choose and decide. Research and marketing are spread across agents, the core code stays on a single thread, every change goes through an adversarial gate, and I give the final approval. That division is all the harness is. Up to this point, it was a good co-founder.
Then it built too well
The problem was that this co-founder was too good at its job.
Building became cheap, so nothing made me stop. Firmware on the dev kit. BLE sync running between a real board and a real phone. On-device ML classifying strokes. The app connected. Hundreds of tests piled up. In a few weeks the product was nearly finished, and not once had I checked whether a single frustrated player would pay to keep using it.
One day, reading the STATUS doc, I stopped. The build items were almost all checked off, but the “is there anyone to sell this to” box was empty. The order was backwards.
The healthy order is plan, validate, build. Mine was plan, build, then validate. On a team, building is expensive enough that someone stops and asks, “are we sure?” Working alone with the harness, nobody asks. The harness had taken away the brake that cost used to provide, that friction.
The gate I should have closed first
The real risk was never “can I build it.” Every sensor in that graveyard could be built too. What killed them was demand and retention, not hardware. So the first thing I should have answered was not a firmware question. It was whether a frustrated player would pay for “here’s why today went wrong, and the one thing to fix,” and then keep paying.
I showed the mockup to 20 friends and club players, and they all liked it. But liking something and buying it are different. The distance between “nice” and “opens their wallet” decides whether a product survives. That gate needs no mold and no code, so it is cheap and fast, and I walked past it straight into the build. What I need to do now is close that gate, not make more firmware.
Wrapping up
Set up the harness before the board or the code. I still think that part holds.
But I should have known what it does to the person using it. The harness makes building so cheap that it becomes easy to skip the gate that asks whether the build was worth making. It writes the code for you. It does not tell you to stop and validate first. That call still belongs to a person, and it is exactly the one I got wrong.
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